Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

State of Utah v. Brian E. Maguire : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brian Maguire.
Thomas B. Bunker, James Cope.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Brian Maguire, No. 950246 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6585

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 950246-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Priority No. 3

BRIAN MAGUIRE
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE IMPOSED ON DEFENDANT'S
GUILTY PLEA TO AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A THIRD DEGREE
FELONY PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-103 (1995), IN
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE WILLIAM H. BOHLING
PRESIDING

o iMfi UJURT OF APPEAL?
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
60

DOCKET NO. 2222Mfc£fiL

THOMAS B. BRUNKER (4804)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180

BRIAN MAGUIRE
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

JAMES COPE
Assistant District Attorney
231 East 400 South #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Appellant

Attorneys for Appellee

ljt*T*' *"»«M»t

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 950246-CA

v.
Priority No. 3

BRIAN MAGUIRE
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE IMPOSED ON DEFENDANT'S
GUILTY PLEA TO AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A THIRD DEGREE
FELONY PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-103 (1995), IN
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE WILLIAM H. BOHLING
PRESIDING
THOMAS B. BRUNKER (4 804)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
BRIAN MAGUIRE
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

JAMES COPE
Assistant District Attorney
231 East 400 South #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Appellant

Attorneys for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT
I.

BECAUSE DEFENDANT ARGUED IN THE TRIAL COURT
ONLY THAT DOUBLE JEOPARDY ALWAYS PROHIBITS
IMPOSING A HARSHER SENTENCE AFTER A SUCCESSFUL
APPEAL, HE FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS SPECIFIC
CLAIM THAT DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROHIBITED
RESENTENCING HIM BECAUSE HE COMPLETED THE FIRST
SENTENCE WHILE HIS APPEAL WAS PENDING
....

II.

ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FAILS ON ITS
MERITS BECAUSE HE CANNOT SIMULTANEOUSLY
CHALLENGE THE PLEA ON WHICH THE FIRST SENTENCE
WAS BASED AND CLAIM A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION
OF FINALITY IN THAT SENTENCE

B.

Resentencing defendant after his second
plea does not punish him twice for the
same offense

13

Defendant had no expectation of finality
in the first sentence as long as he
continued to challenge the underlying
guilty plea

14

CONCLUSION

19

ADDENDUM
Addendum A

13

- Statutes and Rules
i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376 (1989)

14,

Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873)
North Carolina v. Pearce, 39i

')

11,

Pasquarille v. United States, : 30 F.3d 1220
(6th Cir. 1997)

. .

United State v. Bishop, 774 F.2d at 775
United States v. Andersson, 813 F.2d 1450
(9th Cir. 1987)
United States v. Daddino, 5 F.3d 262 (7th Cir. 1993)
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980)
United States v. Foqel, 829 F.2d 77 (D.C. Cir. 1987i

. 11, _.,
. . ..

United States v. Jones, 722 F.2d at 637
United States v. Rodriguez, 114 F.3d 46 (5th Cir. 1997)

..

United States v. Woodhouse, 109
cert, denied, 118 S. Ct. 143
Woodhouse v. United States, 934
(C. D. 111. 1996), affirmed,
cert, denied, 118 S. Ct. 143

15,

F.3d 347 (7th Cir.),
(1997)
F. Supp. 1008
109 F.3d 347 (7th Cir.),
(1997)

STATE CASES
State v. Beltran-Felix, 922 P.2d 30 (Utah App. 1996)

....

State v. Davis, 903 P.2d 940 (Utah App. 1995),
reversed on other grounds, slip op. 960005 (Utah 1998)
State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah),
cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989)
State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1992)

ii

3

State v. Maauire, 924 P.2d 904 (Utah App. 1996)

3, 7

State v. Maauire, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997)

7

State v. Maauire, 957 P.2d 598 (Utah 1998)

3, 7

State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994),
cert, denied. 513 U.S. 1115 (1995)

1

State v. Ranael, 866 P.2d 607 (Utah App. 1993)
State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913 (Utah App. 1992)

10
. . . .

1, 10

FEDERAL STATUTES
U.S. Const, amend. V

2
STATE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1995)

6

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995)

1, 2, 18

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-105 (1995)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1995)

1

iii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 950246-CA

v.
Priority No. 3

BRIAN MAGUIRE
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Brian Maguire appeals the trial court's denial of
his motion to correct sentence (R. 765). The trial court imposed
the sentence on defendant's plea to aggravated assault, a third
degree felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995) (R.
632) .

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §

78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1995) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did defendant preserve the double jeopardy claim he

raises on appeal; alternatively, did the trial court commit plain
error by not recognizing and reaching appellate claim sua sponte?
Defendant's failure to preserve the issue permits appellate
review for plain error only.

See, e.g., State v. Menzies, 889

P.2d 393, 404-405 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115
(1995).

Defendant's failure to argue plain error on appeal

precludes reaching the merits of defendant's claim.
Seoulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 (Utah App. 1992).

State v.

2.

Alternatively, did defendant have a legitimate

expectation of finality in the sentence imposed on his first plea
even though he challenged the plea on appeal?

This claim

requires a ruling on the applicability of the federal double
jeopardy clause; therefore, it raises an issue of constitutional
interpretation reviewed for correctness.

State v. Davis, 903

P.2d 940, 943 (Utah App. 1995), reversed on other grounds, slip
op. 960005 (Utah 1998).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Addendum A contains the text of U.S. Const, amend. V.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By amended information dated January 2, 1988, the State
charged defendant with aggravated assault, a third degree felony,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995); mayhem, a second
degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-105 (1995); and
being an habitual criminal, a first degree felony, pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990) (R. 31-33).
On April 21, 1988, defendant pleaded no contest to
aggravated assault, and the trial court granted the State's
motion to dismiss the other two counts (R. 111-113).

On April

22, 1988, the trial court lowered the third-degree felony
aggravated assault to a class A misdemeanor and sentenced
defendant to not more than one year in prison to run concurrently
with any other sentences (R. 114).

2

Defendant moved to withdraw his plea on August 10, 1988 (R.
124).

The trial court denied his motion (R. 260). This Court

reversed in an unpublished opinion, and the supreme court
affirmed this Court's disposition.

State v. Maquire, 830 P.2d

216, 217-18 (Utah 1991).
On remand, defendant again pleaded guilty to aggravated
assault, and the State again moved to dismiss the mayhem and
habitual criminal charges (R. 571, 625-26, 866-68).

On this

plea, the trial court imposed the statutorily prescribed zero-tofive-year prison sentence and ordered it to run consecutively
with any other sentences defendant was then serving (R. 632, 88187).

The trial court also gave defendant credit for the time he

served on his previous no contest plea (R. 632, 880).
Defendant filed a motion to correct the sentence, contending
that the trial court illegally imposed the zero-to-five-year
consecutive sentence because it was more severe than the sentence
imposed on his original no-contest plea (R. 636-54, 739-45).

The

trial court denied the motion in a signed minute entry dated
March 17, 1995 (R. 765).

Defendant timely filed his notice of

appeal (R. 774).
This Court reversed the trial court.
P.2d 904 (Utah App. 1996).

State v. Maquire, 924

The Supreme Court reversed this Court

and remanded the case for consideration of defendant's double
jeopardy claim.

State v. Maquire, 957 P.2d 598, 600 (Utah 1998).

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Defendant's first plea.

While on parole from a prior murder conviction, defendant
tore off the top third of his grandmother's ear (R. 29, 111, 408,
443, 447-50, 626).

The State charged defendant with aggravated

assault, a third degree felony; mayhem, a second

degree felony;

and being an habitual criminal, a first degree felony (R. 31-33).
A parole supervisor filed an information on defendant's parole
violation, citing the

mayhem and aggravated assault charges as

two of four bases for revoking defendant's parole on his prior
murder conviction (R. 133, 654, 663, 670, 700) .
Defendant ultimately pleaded no contest to the third degree
felony aggravated assault charge in exchange for the State's
agreement to dismiss the mayhem and habitual criminal charges, to
recommend reducing the third degree felony aggravated assault to
a class A misdemeanor, and to permit him to withdraw the plea if
the trial court refused the reduced sentence recommendation (R.
111-12; Tr. April 21, 1988 at 2, 5-6, 8-9).

The trial court

granted the motion to reduce the sentence, sentenced defendant to
a prison term not to exceed one year, and ordered the prison
sentence to run concurrently with any other sentence (R. 114; Tr.
April 21, 1988 at 14-15) .
In reliance on his no-contest plea to aggravated assault,
the Board of Pardons revoked defendant's parole on his prior
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murder conviction (R. 133, 655, 670, 673) .
Defendant succeeded on his subsequent appellate challenge to
his no-contest plea.

State v. Maquire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1992).

While that appeal was pending, defendant completed the one-year
sentence that resulted from that plea.

However, he remained

incarcerated on the revocation of his parole on his prior murder
conviction (R. 877).
B.

Defendant's second plea.

The case was remanded to the trial court, the State
reinstated the charges, and defendant went to trial.

Part way

through trial, defendant initiated new plea negotiations (R.
863).

Pursuant to the resulting plea agreement, defendant

pleaded guilty to the same third degree felony aggravated
assault, and the State again moved to dismiss the mayhem and
habitual criminal charges (R. 571, 625-26, 866-68).

This time,

however, defendant did not move for and the State did not agree
to recommend reducing the sentence to a class A misdemeanor
(id.).

Consequently, the trial court sentenced defendant to a

zero-to-five-year prison term without any objection from
defendant (R. 632, 881-87).

Over defendant's objection, the

trial court also ordered the sentence to run consecutively with
defendant's sentence on his murder conviction (id.).

The

sentencing court gave defendant credit for the one year he served
on the prior, class A misdemeanor conviction (R. 632, 880) .

5

Defendant did not contend that double jeopardy prohibited
resentencing him because he had completed the one-year sentence
imposed on the first plea.
C.

Defendant's current motion to correct sentence.

Over two years later, defendant filed a motion to correct
the sentence (R. 636-54, 379-45).

In his motion, defendant

contended that both Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1995) and the
federal proscription against double jeopardy prohibited imposing
a harsher sentence (R. 636-38).

Again, defendant did not contend

that double jeopardy prohibited resentencing him because he had
completed the original sentence (id.).
The trial court denied the motion and defendant appealed (R.
765, 774).

On appeal to this Court, defendant contended that: 1)

his trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to challenge
the legality of his sentence; 2) section 76-3-405 prohibited the
harsher sentence; 3) double jeopardy prohibited imposing a
sentence on his aggravated assault plea that ran consecutively to
his prison term on the murder conviction because both sentences
arose from the same set of facts; and 4) double jeopardy and due
process prohibited resentencing him on the second aggravated
assault plea because he had completed the sentence imposed on the
first plea.

Appellant's Supplemental Brief in Maguire I at 14-

39.
In responding to defendant's fourth argument, the only one

6

at issue on this remand, the State contended that defendant had
not preserved the argument and had failed to brief it adequately.
Appellee's Brief in Maguire I at 20-21.

This Court addressed

only the second and third of defendant's appellate claims.
v. Maguire, 924 P.2d 904, 905 (Utah App. 1996).

State

The Court held

that double jeopardy did not prohibit both revoking defendant's
parole and punishing him criminally for the aggravated assault on
his grandmother.

Id. at 905-906.

However, the Court reversed

the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to correct
defendant's sentence, holding that § 76-3-405 prohibited the
harsher sentence.

Id. at 906-907.

The Utah Supreme Court granted the State's petition for writ
of certiorari.

State v. Maguire, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997).

In

his merits brief, defendant again contended that double jeopardy
prohibited the second, harsher sentence because he had completed
the first.

Respondent's Brief at 44-48.

The supreme court reversed this Court's holding that section
76-3-405 prohibited the harsher sentence.
P.2d 598, 599-600 (Utah 1998).

State v. Maguire, 957

However, the supreme court

concluded that the double jeopardy claim was not properly before
it and remanded the case to this Court for consideration of that
claim.

State v. Maguire, 957 P.2d at 600.

The argument sections below contain additional relevant
facts.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Preservation of claim.

Defendant never presented the

trial court with his appellate claim that double jeopardy
prohibited resentencing him because he had completed the first
sentence.

Therefore, defendant has not preserved this issue for

appeal.
Similarly, defendant has not established that the trial
court plainly erred by not reaching this conclusion sua sponte.
Indeed, no controlling precedent mandates the result defendant
seeks.
2.

Therefore, defendant cannot establish plain error.
Double jeopardy.

on its merits.

Alternatively, defendant's claim fails

First, defendant contends that resentencing him

after he had completed the first sentence on the withdrawn plea
imposed multiple punishments for the same crime.

However, the

"multiple punishments" proscription only prohibits imposing more
punishment than the legislature allows and, on resentencing to a
harsher sentence, requires only that defendant receive credit for
time served on the first sentence.

The trial court gave

defendant credit for the one year he served on the class A
misdemeanor and imposed only the statutory sentence for the third
degree felony.

Therefore, the trial court did not impose a

second punishment for the same crime.
Second, double jeopardy would preclude resentencing
defendant only if he had a legitimate expectation of finality in

8

the completed first sentence.

However, because defendant

continued to challenge the plea underlying the first sentence, he
had no legitimate expectation of finality in it.

Therefore, the

trial court could resentence defendant without violating double
jeopardy.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE DEFENDANT ARGUED IN THE TRIAL COURT ONLY THAT
DOUBLE JEOPARDY ALWAYS PROHIBITS IMPOSING A HARSHER
SENTENCE AFTER A SUCCESSFUL APPEAL, HE FAILED TO
PRESERVE HIS SPECIFIC CLAIM THAT DOUBLE JEOPARDY
PROHIBITED RESENTENCING HIM BECAUSE HE COMPLETED THE
FIRST SENTENCE WHILE HIS APPEAL WAS PENDING
On this remand, defendant once again contends that, because
he completed the class A misdemeanor sentence imposed on his
original no-contest plea, double jeopardy prohibited imposing the
statutory zero-to-five year prison term on his second guilty plea
to the same offense.

Appellant's Brief at 9-17.

Defendant has

not preserved this claim or argued any basis for considering its
merits despite his procedural default.

Therefore, the Court need

not consider this claim on its merits.
In the trial court, defendant argued only that double
jeopardy always prohibits imposing the harsher sentence after his
successful appeal (R. 638). Although defendant mentioned that he
had already completed the first sentence, he did not rely on
completing the first sentence to support his double jeopardy
argument.
9

Defendant did not argue that his completion of the first
sentence raised the double jeopardy bar until he filed his first
brief in this Court.

Appellant's Brief in Maguire I at 36. l

Defendant's failure to present this argument to the trial court
deprived that court of the first opportunity to dispose of the
claim and, consequently, failed to preserve the claim for appeal.
See, e.g., State v. Beltran-Felix, 922 P.2d 30, 33 (Utah App.
1996) (where defendant objected only on Fifth Amendment grounds
to the victim witness remaining in the courtroom, he could not
add Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims on appeal); State v.
Range1, 866 P.2d 607, 611-12 (Utah App. 1993) (references to an
evidentiary rule and general references to due process concerns
were insufficient to preserve a facial constitutional challenge
to the rule).
Defendant could nevertheless prevail on this argument if he
could establish that the trial court plainly erred by not finding
that double jeopardy prohibited resentencing him because he had
completed the first sentence.

See, e.g., State v. Sepulveda, 842

P.2d 913, 917 (Utah App. 1992).

However, defendant does not

argue that the trial court plainly erred, instead treating the
issue as though he preserved it.

:

His failure to argue plain

However, even in that brief, defendant provided no case
authority or analysis to support his contention. Instead,
defendant waited until he filed his brief in the supreme court to
provide any analysis and case authority. Respondent's Brief at
44-48.
10

error bars considering the merits of his claim.

Id. at 917-18.

Alternatively, defendant cannot establish plain error in
this case.

Controlling precedent required the trial court to

reject the only argument defendant made to it: that double
jeopardy always precludes imposing a harsher sentence after a
successful appeal.

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720-

22 (1969) (double jeopardy poses no bar to imposing a harsher
sentence after a successful challenge to a conviction).
Moreover, nothing in the controlling precedent should have
alerted the trial court that it should reach and resolve sua
sponte the issue defendant raises here: that completion of the
first sentence raised a double jeopardy bar to resentencing him.
To the contrary, the controlling precedent would have led the
trial court to believe that defendant's challenge to the first
guilty plea vitiated any double jeopardy claim.

In United States

v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980), the Supreme Court held
that the government's right to appeal destroyed DiFrancesco's
expectation of finality in his first sentence; therefore, double
jeopardy did not prohibit resentencing him to a harsher sentence.
In Pearce, the Supreme Court held that a defendant's success on
appeal "wipes the slate clean," and double jeopardy poses no
proscription to increasing the sentence on retrial.

North

Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 720-22.
Neither case included any provision that completing the
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sentence while the appeal was pending would require a different
result.

To the contrary, in Pearce, two concurring opinions

suggested that the blanket rule would not apply if the defendant
had fully served the original sentence; however, the majority
made no exception to its broad rule for that eventuality.

Id. at

720-22, 750 n.7 (Harlan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in
part), 732-33 (Douglas J., concurring).

From this, the trial

court could have inferred that the United States Supreme Court
rejected making a distinction based on whether a defendant had
completed the original sentence.
Moreover, defendant cites no controlling cases that clearly
required the trial court to come to the contrary conclusion, and
the State found none.

As discussed in the following point, the

few cases that the State found that have addressed the issue
directly hold that completion of the sentence while the appeal is
pending does not create a double jeopardy bar to resentencing.
Therefore, defendant cannot establish that the trial court
plainly erred by not holding sua sponte that the sentencing court
violated his double jeopardy rights by resentencing him to a
harsher sentence after he had completed the first while his
appeal was pending.

See State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 36

(Utah) (error in failing to make written findings required by
case law not obvious where the appellate decision establishing
the requirement had not yet been decided), cert. denied, 493 U.S.

12

814 (1989).
POINT II
ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FAILS ON ITS MERITS
BECAUSE HE CANNOT SIMULTANEOUSLY CHALLENGE THE PLEA ON
WHICH THE FIRST SENTENCE WAS BASED AND CLAIM A
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF FINALITY IN THAT SENTENCE
Defendant contends that imposing the harsher sentence after
his second plea even though he had completed the sentence after
the first plea violated the double jeopardy proscription against
punishing him twice for the same offense.
9-15.

Appellant's Brief at

Defendant applies the wrong double jeopardy analysis to

this claim: resentencing does not punish him twice for the same
crime.
Instead, the appropriate double jeopardy inquiry is whether
defendant acquired a legitimate expectation of finality in the
first sentence; if he did, double jeopardy prohibited
resentencing him.

However, because defendant continued to

challenge the plea underlying the first sentence even after he
fully served the sentence, he had no legitimate expectation of
finality in that sentence.
A.

Resentencing defendant after his second plea does not
punish him twice for the same offense.

The State does not dispute defendant's general proposition
that double jeopardy prohibits punishing him twice for the same
offense.

However, that proscription ensures only that the total

punishment imposed does not exceed that permitted by the
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legislature.

Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 276, 381 (1989).

In the

context of resentencing a criminal defencant after a successful
challenge to the first conviction or sentence, the proscription
against imposing multiple punishments for the same crime requires
only that defendant receive credit for the time he served on the
first sentence.

Id. at 381-82; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395

U.S. 711, 717-19 (1969).
On defendant's second plea, the trial court imposed the
statutorily-prescribed penalty and gave aefendant credit for the
time that he served on his first sentence against his second (R.
632, 880). The proscription against imposing multiple
punishments required no more.
B.

Id.

Defendant had no expectation of finality in the first
sentence as long as he continued to challenge the
underlying guilty plea.

The appropriate inquiry in determining whether double
jeopardy precluded resentencing defendant is whether defendant
acquired a legitimate expectation of finality in the original
sentence.

See, e.g., Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. at 396.

This

analysis evolved from the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
The criminal statute at issue in DiFrancesco gave the
government a limited right to appeal a sentence.

Id. at 119-20.

DiFrancesco argued that double jeopardy prohibited giving the
government a right to appeal his sentence.

14

The Supreme Court

rejected that argument, holding that "a sentence does not have
the qualitites of constitutional finality that attend an
acquittal."

Id. at 135.

The Supreme Court further supported its

holding by noting that DiFrancesco had no legitimate expectation
of finality in the first sentence because he was charged with
knowledge that the statute gave the government the right to
appeal the sentence.

Id. at 136.

That language has become the

controlling analysis: double jeopardy prohibits increasing an
already-imposed sentence only after a defendant acquires a
legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence.
Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. at 396;

See,

e.g..

Pasguarille v. United States,

130 F.3d 1220, 1222-23 (6~ Cir. 1997); United States v.
Rodriguez, 114 F.3d 46, 48 (5^ Cir. 1997); United States v.
Daddino, 5 F.3d 262, 265 (7" Cir. 1993); United States v. Foael,
829 F.2d 77, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United States v. Andersson, 813
F.2d 1450, 1461 (9^ Cir. 1987); Woodhouse v. United States, 934
F. Supp. 1008, 1014 (C. D. 111. 1996), affirmed, 109 F.3d 347
(7"' Cir.), cert, denied, 118 S. Ct. 143 (1997).
Defendant contends that double jeopardy barred resentencing
him because he had completed the first sentence while his appeal
on the underlying plea was pending.

Consequently, the double

jeopardy issue this case presents is whether defendant obtained
an expectation of finality in his sentence upon its completion
even though he continued to prosecute the appeal challenging the
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underlying plea.
No United States Supreme Court case or prior case from the
Utah courts addresses this precise issue.

However, decisions

from other jurisdictions that have dealt with the issue directly
have rejected the argument defendant makes.

For example, in

Pasauarille v. United States, 130 F.3d 1220 (6-h cir. 1997), the
sixth circuit rejected Pasquarille's contention that he had a
legitimate expectation of finality in a completed sentence on an
unchallenged conviction because he challenged an interrelated
conviction.

In that case, the district court originally imposed

a thirty-seven month prison term on a drug charge and a
consecutive sixty month term on a related firearms charge.
at 1221.
only.

Id.

Pasquarille moved to vacate the firearms conviction

Id.

While the motion was pending, defendant completed the

sentence on the drug conviction.

Id. at 1221-22.

The district

court granted Pasquarille's motion and vacated the firearms
conviction.

Id. at 1221.

It then proceeded to increase the

already-completed sentence on the drug conviction.

Id.

On appeal, Pasquarille contended, as defendant contends,
that double jeopardy prohibited the increase because he had
already completed the sentence on the drug conviction.
1222-23.

The sixth circuit rejected that contention.

Id. at
The court

held that Pasquarille's challenge to the related firearms
conviction destroyed any expectation of finality Pasquarille
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might have had in the completed drug conviction sentence.

Id.

See also Woodhouse v. United States, 934 F. Supp. at 1014 (C. D.
111.

1996).
If a challenge to a conviction can defeat an expectation of

finality in a completed sentence on a separate, related, and
unchallenged conviction, then an appeal of the plea should
clearly destroy any expectation of finality in the sentence on
that plea.

Therefore, defendant's continued challenge to his

first plea destroyed any expectation of finality in the resulting
sentence even though defendant completed the sentence while the
appeal was pending.
Defendant cites no case that requires the contrary result,
and the State found none.2

Instead, defendant relies primarily

:

The State recognizes that dicta exists that suggests that
completing the sentence may create an expectation of finality.
For example, in United States v. Daddino, 5 F.3d 262 (7-'" Cir.
1993), cited by defendant, the seventh circuit stated the Daddino
acquired an expectation of finality in the portion of the
sentence that he had completed. Id. at 265. However, the court
also noted that, at the time the trial court amended Daddino's
sentence, the time for either Daddino or the government to appeal
had passed. Because neither Daddino nor the government appealed
that conviction, Daddino acquired a legitimate expectation of
finality in the sentence.
Moreover, in a later case, the seventh circuit affirmed a
district court's holding that the defendant's appeal of a related
sentence defeated the defendant's expectation of finality in a
completed sentence. United States v. Woodhouse, 109 F.3d 347,
348 (1^ Cir.), cert, denied, 118 S. Ct. 143 (1997). Therefore,
the seventh circuit has now disavowed the dictum in Daddino on
which defendant relies. At most, Daddino stands for the
proposition that a defendant acquires an expectation of finality
in a sentence arising out of a conviction that neither the
defendant nor the government timely challenges. The State does
17

on the nineteenth century Supreme Court decision in Ex Parte
Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873).

However, the Supreme Court limited

Lange to stand only for the proposition that a defendant may
receive no greater sentence than the legislature prescribed.
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 140.

See also United

States v. Jones, 722 F.2d at 637; United State v. Bishop, 774
F.2d at 775.

The trial court did not violate the Lange

proscription: the statute specifically authorized the zero-tofive-year sentence (R. 632, 881-87).
(1995) and 76-3-203(3)

Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-103

(1995).

In sum, defendant's appellate challenge to the first plea
prevented him from acquiring any expectation of finality in the
resulting class A misdemeanor sentence.

His completion of that

sentence prior to the resolution of his appeal does not change
that result.

Double jeopardy required only that he receive

credit for the time served on the first sentence against the
second.

Because the trial court gave him that, defendant has

received all that the Constitution guaranteed him.

not dispute that proposition.
Similarly, in United States v. Andersson, 813 F.2d 1450 (9"-~
Cir. 1987), the ninth circuit held that Andersson had no
expectation of finality because he challenged his sentence on
appeal and had not completed the sentence. Id. at 1461.
Although the language suggests that completion may give rise to
an expectation of finality despite the appeal, Andersson had not
completed the sentence; therefore, the ninth circuit did not have
definitively resolve that issue.
18

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendant's defendant's
sentence should be affirmed.
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ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM A

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.

